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CAPPING AUDITOR LIABILITY: 
UNSUITABLE FISCAL POLICY IN OUR 
CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INTRODUCTION 
Solving the current global financial crisis will require increased 
investment in the capital markets coupled with appropriate government 
intervention.1 In order to ensure that investors will provide the impetus 
necessary to revive our economy, it is of the utmost importance that 
investors are confident in our domestic capital markets.2 As one 
commentator has noted “[i]t may be the [confident] investor who has 
[created] a multi-trillion dollar public securities market in which 
corporations . . . annually raise hundreds of billions of dollars of new 
capital . . . . But there is good reason to suspect that trusting investors may 
be the heart and soul of the modern market.”3  
In the first quarter of 2009, the household sector, consisting of 
individual investors, held over 36.9% of corporate equities in the United 
States.4 From 2007 through the third quarter of 2009, investment in 
corporate equities by the household sector alone, dropped from a high of 
917 trillion dollars to a four year low of 518 trillion dollars.5 This drastic 
drop in individual investment correlates to severe decreases in investor 
confidence.6 Individual investors play an irrefutable role in the economy, 
and they currently possess billions of dollars in liquidity that they are 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Gregory W. Brown & Christian Lundblad, The U.S. Economic Crisis: Root Causes and the 
Road to Recovery, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 2009, available at 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2009/Oct/20091781.htm?action=print (arguing that 
any solution to the economic crisis must begin with both, higher levels of real and financial 
investment, and smart national economic policies, such as capitalizing on exports and increased 
government spending).  
 2. Posting of Tom Davenport to Harvard Business Review Blogs, 
http://discussionleader.hbsp.com/davenport/2008/10/we_need_to_renovate_the_old_ec.html (Oct. 
21, 2008, 18:56 EST); see also Ken Little, Stock Market Often Leads Economy in Rebound, 
ABOUT.COM, http://stocks.about.com/od/investing101/a/020909stocks.htm (arguing that in order 
for the stock market to lead the economy out of the financial crisis “investors must once again feel 
confident about the economy and the stock market”).  
 3. Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game 35 (UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 02-18, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=322301.  
 4. FED. RESERVE SYS., BD. OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE: 
FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 90, tbl. L.213 (Dec. 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/. To compute the numbers above, the 
percentage of corporate equities held by the household sector was reached by dividing the dollar 
amount, in billions, of corporate equities held by the household sector, by the total holdings of 
corporate equities at market value. See id. It is important to note that the household sector does not 
include individual investors who invest through mutual funds, which accounts for another $3304.9 
billion invested in corporate equities. Id. at 90. 
 5. Id. at 90. 
 6. Dave Valiante, Investors’ Confidence in U.S. Capital Markets Drops, WALL ST. & TECH., 
Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=210002944.  
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reluctant to invest.7 It is this very liquidity that could revive our capital 
markets, thereby necessitating a policy that mends and increases investor 
confidence, allowing investors to reinvest in the markets as they once did. 
One important way that investor confidence is developed and 
maintained is through the rigorous external audits that corporations 
undergo.8 Audit reports are vital in order to make investors aware of the 
financial health of a corporation, and bestow upon them the ability to make 
informed decisions on whether a particular investment is suitable.9 In our 
current financial state, the role of the auditor is paramount, and the laws that 
regulate the role of auditors are more crucial than ever in order to increase 
investor confidence.10 
Like most aspects of the capital markets, statutory law heavily 
influences the role of auditors.11 Statutory law governs much of what 
auditors are required to investigate and disclose to potential investors, as 
well as the steps they are required to take to ensure accuracy.12 However, 
the threat of litigation serves as another strong force to ensure accuracy in 
external audits.13 Because the costs of potential litigation are so excessive, 
auditors are forced to ensure that the reports they issue to the investing 
public are thorough and precise.14 If the United States and major capital 
markets abroad were to cap the liabilities that auditors face, a major 
incentive to do thorough, accurate work would be lifted.15 Such a 
disincentive would result in a decrease in investor confidence, which in turn 
could have a devastating effect on the global capital markets as investors 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Roy Furchgott, You’ve Sold Your Stock. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at 
SPG4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/your-money/asset-allocation/26stash. 
html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=investors%20sidelines%202008&st=cse; see also Ron Lieber, Switching 
to Cash May Feel Safe, but Risks Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/yourmoney/09money.html?scp=17&sq=investors%
20sidelines%202008&st=cse. 
 8. See Sarah Johnson, The Cost of Auditor Independence, CFO.COM, Feb. 12, 2009, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/13111528.  
 9. See generally Marianne Ojo, The Role of External Auditors and International Accounting 
Bodies in Financial Regulation and Supervision (Mar. 2006), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/354/.  
 10. John P. Coffey, Trouble with a Cap on Liability: Protecting Auditors Weakens Corporate 
Accountability, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 12, 2008, http://www.pionline.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080512/PRINTSUB/206375828/1026/TOC.  
 11. See Jeffrey W. Gunther & Robert R. Moore, Auditing the Auditors: Oversight or Overkill?, 
ECON. & FIN. POL’Y REV., 2002, at 1, 10, 14, available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/ 
efpr/pdfs/v01_n05_a01.pdf (discussing federal legislation of auditors).  
 12. Id. at 14. 
 13. See id. at 15.  
 14. Id.  
 15. CEA, CEA Response to the EC Consultation on Auditors’ Liability and Its Impact on the 
European Capital Markets, Annex 1 to RC7022 (03/07) (Mar. 15, 2007), www.cea.eu/ 
uploads/DocumentsLibrary/documents/position324.pdf.  
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began to invest less money.16 “Investors invest not because they trust 
managers, brokers, and investment advisors, but because they rely on the 
legal system to discourage managers, brokers, and investment advisors from 
behaving like the scoundrels they are.”17 Auditor liability is an integral part 
of the legal system these investors rely on. Despite these potentially severe 
side effects, there is a movement in the United States to cap the liabilities 
which auditors face.18 Since early 2008, there has been a concerted effort 
among domestic auditors to push the Treasury Department to provide 
public policy recommendations in favor of capping auditors’ liabilities.19 
In light of the fact that there is a serious movement to cap liability,20 it 
is necessary to investigate the devastating effects that these policies will 
have on the U.S. capital markets vis-à-vis investor confidence. Capping 
auditor liability, which will decrease investor confidence at a time when the 
domestic and global capital markets are so fragile and in desperate need of 
the economic boost that continued financial investment could provide, is an 
uncalled for and inappropriate policy in our current financial climate. 
Part I of this note discusses the role of auditors in our capital markets 
and the effects that audit reports have on individual investors. Part II 
discusses the history of auditor regulation and legislation, the current 
regulatory state, and the role that crisis has played in revolutionizing the 
importance of the auditor in our capital markets. Part III examines the 
liabilities which auditors face in the current legislative and regulatory 
climate and the reasons why auditors are calling for liability reform. Part IV 
discusses the various proposals for reforming auditor liability being 
considered and the reasons why these various plans will be detrimental to 
our markets. Finally, Part V examines the potential effects of capping 
auditor liability in light of our incredibly fragile economic situation. 
I. THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR IN INVESTMENT & CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
The auditor is an integral component of our financial capital markets, 
and it is necessary to understand the purposes the auditor serves before 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Directorate General for Internal Market and Services, Summary Report: Consultation on 
Auditor’s Liability: Summary Report, at 14 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/summary_report_en.pdf [hereinafter Directorate General, 
Summary Report].  
 17. Stout, supra note 3, at 293. “The possibility that many investors invest because they ‘trust 
the market’ . . . offers to explain a number of otherwise-puzzling market anomalies that are 
difficult if not impossible to reconcile with the rational expectations model [of investors].” Id. at 
31. 
 18. Tammy Whitehouse, Audit Firms Push (Again) for Liability Caps, COMPLIANCE WK., July 
8, 2008, available at http://www.complianceweek.com/article/4243/audit-firms-push-again-for-
liability-caps.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
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investigating why the liability reforms called for would be so detrimental.21 
For over half a century, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
has supported increased auditor responsibility and “gatekeeper” activity, as 
a means of ensuring the stability of the financial markets and increasing 
investor confidence, thereby providing for further investment in the capital 
markets.22 The external audit report is an integral tool in the capital markets, 
as it signals to investors that the information which management releases in 
regards to the financial health of a corporation is reliable.23 The auditor 
serves as an independent party that can verify the validity of the 
corporation’s statements and bolster investors’ confidence when selecting 
where to invest their money.24 
The SEC believes that the key to promoting investor confidence lies in 
auditor reports that are high quality, thorough, and inform the potential 
investor of the risks involved in purchasing particular securities.25 The 
external audit is the preferred mode of oversight because it purports to be 
more thorough and accurate than the internal audit reports that the 
corporation creates.26 If auditors do their job properly, fraud, misstatements, 
and omissions should be avoided, and investors can be confident in relying 
on financial statements as a guide to proper investment choices.27 
Audit reports have very real and significant consequences on whether 
investors are willing to purchase or retain shares of a corporation.28 
Statements by the auditor that even appear to question the fate of a 
corporation are enough to make current shareholders sell their interests and 
impede future investment in the corporation.29   
The continued reliability of the external audit report is crucial to 
improving investor confidence in our capital markets, which is increasingly 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See generally Gunther & Moore, supra note 11.  
 22. SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2010).  
 23. See generally Ojo, supra note 9.  
 24. Id. at 2. 
 25. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES MARKETS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO 
ENHANCE INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND IMPROVE LISTING PROGRAM OVERSIGHT 102 (2004).  
 26. Johnson, supra note 8. The external audit is seen as a necessary line of defense because 
internal auditors are employed by the company and there are potential conflicts of interest inherent 
in this position. Id. Often internal auditors report to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and it is 
within the CFO’s department that financial misstatements can occur. Id. It might be in the best 
interest of the internal auditor not to report certain misstatements, if it would ensure further job 
security. Id. 
 27. James H. Irving et al., An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Liability Caps on the 
Auditing Market 8 (Feb. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1490056. 
 28. James Dornbrook, Highlighting Risk: Audit Reports that Question a Company’s Ability to 
Continue as a Going Concern Can Light a Fire Under Investors, KAN. CITY BUS. J., May 16, 
2008, available at http://kansascity.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2008/05/19/focus19.html. 
 29. Id.  
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important as of late.30 With the recent financial crisis in the American 
market, it has become necessary to find new sources of capital to pump 
back into our failing system.31 “It’s really about how confidence evolves 
 . . . . Yes, fundamentals are bad, but if investors don’t have confidence to 
lend money to the real economy, then the real economy won’t be able to 
progress.”32 One of the best ways to promote this investor confidence and 
encourage investors to put much needed funds back into our capital markets 
is to ensure that the information they are receiving is valid and informed.33 
The Center for Audit Quality recommends that “[t]o improve their 
confidence in the U.S. capital markets . . . investors support the creation of 
an institute to enable auditing firms to share experiences and develop best 
practices for fraud prevention and detection.”34 There is also a push for 
rules that require further public disclosure, as well as forms that are easier 
for the average investor to read and comprehend, in order to allow more 
informed investment decisions.35 All of these efforts would further the goal 
of increasing transparency of corporate financials and promote further 
investment and involvement in the capital markets.36 
As the economy is now in a recession, the necessary revival of the 
capital markets will be facilitated by increased investor confidence as a 
means of ensuring continued financial investment.37 Investor confidence has 
clearly been affected by the current financial crisis.38 “[F]or investors, the 
level of pessimism and fear is so obvious it hardly needs to be measured, 
but it is confirmed by the data.”39 In the midst of the most recent financial 
crisis, a poll “of its members by the American Association of Individual 
Investors . . . . [showed] bearishness ha[d] risen to 56.7% bearish, and 
bullishness had dropped to only 21.7% . . . . ”40 The same poll, a week later 
showed “55.1% [of members] were bearish, [and] only 24.3% [were] 
bullish.”41 In addition, “the Fear Index [VIX Index] . . . show[ed] a 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the SIFMA Annual Conference: The Road to 
Investor Confidence (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch 
102709mls.htm. 
 31. Valiante, supra note 6.  
 32. Jeremy Gaunt, Markets’ Success in September Depends on Investors’ Confidence, INT’L 
HERALD TR., Aug. 31, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=15762397. 
 33. See generally Valiante, supra note 6. 
 34. Id.   
 35. Id.  
 36. See generally id.  
 37. Schapiro, supra note 30. 
 38. Valiante, supra note 6.  
 39. Sy Harding, Consumer and Investor Sentiment!, FIN. SENSE, Feb. 27, 2009, 
http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/harding/2009/0227.html. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
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considerably higher level of investor fear than at the bottom of any of the 
legs down in the 2000–2002 bear market.”42 
State Street Global Markets, an investment-trading branch of a publicly 
traded corporation, also creates an Investor Confidence Index to measure 
investor confidence in the capital markets.43 
The State Street Investor Confidence Index measures investor confidence 
on a quantitative basis by analyzing the actual buying and selling patterns 
of institutional investors. The index is based on a financial theory that 
assigns precise meaning to changes in investor risk appetite, or the 
willingness of investors to allocate their portfolios to equities. The more of 
their portfolio that institutional investors are willing to devote to equities, 
the greater their risk appetite or confidence [in the capital markets].44 
In 2007, investor confidence of North American investors in the capital 
markets ranged between 89.3 and 118.9.45 This is high in light of the fact 
that average scores during healthy economic times are normally between 
100 and 110.46 In late 2007 through 2008, the investor confidence index 
began to show a dramatic decline.47 This dramatic decline in investor 
confidence correlates to the beginning of the current financial crisis.48 In 
October 2008 alone, the index of North American investors declined 25.1 
points to an all time low of 50.8.49 This was an “unprecedented decline in 
investor confidence to a new record low, led by investors in North 
America.”50  
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. “[T]he poll of its members by the American Association of Individual Investors is 
considered to be at extreme pessimism whenever the poll shows bearishness has risen to more 
than 55%, and bullishness has dropped below 25%.” Id.  
 43. See generally STATE STREET, INVESTOR CONFIDENCE INDEX SUMMARY (2008).  
The State Street Investor Confidence Index® measures the attitude of investors to risk. 
The Index uses the principles of modern financial theory to model the underlying 
behavior of global investors. The Index provides a quantitative measure of the actual 
and changing levels of risk contained in investment portfolios representing about 15% 
of the world’s tradable assets. 
Id. at 5. 
 44. Press Release, State Street, Investor Confidence Index Declines from 75.7 to 58.2 in 
October (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://pr.statestreet.com/us/en/20081021_1.html [hereinafter 
Press Release, State Street]. 
 45. STATE STREET, INVESTOR CONFIDENCE INDEX HISTORICAL DATA 1, 
http://www.statestreet.com/industry_insights/investor_confidence_index/ici_overview.html (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2010). 
 46. See id. (when the economy was relatively healthy in 2003–2005 averages tended to range 
between these numbers). 
 47. Id.  
 48. See Krassimir Petrov, Current Economic Crisis Worse than the Great Depression, 
MARKET ORACLE, Nov. 2, 2008, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article7099.html (discussing the 
beginning of the current financial crisis).  
 49. Press Release, State Street, supra note 44.  
 50. Id.  
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Capping the liability of auditors at a time when accurate reports are 
necessary could worsen this precipitous drop in investor confidence and 
have further devastating effects. This decrease in investor confidence was 
likely caused by the domestic financial crisis, followed by the spread of 
these effects globally.51 It is the fear that domestic and international capital 
markets have entered into a recession that has, and will continue to, 
decrease investor confidence a great deal.52 The United States’ position as a 
leader of the global economy could be at stake if the capital markets are not 
revived with new investments.53 Foreign leaders have questioned whether 
the U.S. dollar should remain in the prominent position it currently holds in 
the global economy.54 While this is mere speculation, it is worth noting that 
fast resolution and revival of our capital markets through increased investor 
confidence and investment could very well be the best way to ensure our 
position as a global economic leader.55 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF AUDITOR REGULATION AND 
LEGISLATION & THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME 
An earlier financial crisis, the Great Depression, sheds light upon the 
origins of the role of the external auditor.56 Following World War I, the 
economy of the United States was strong and many individuals began to 
invest their money in publicly traded companies.57 During this surge of 
investment activity, there was little federal regulation of the securities 
markets.58 While many proposals that called for the federal government to 
oversee the sale of stocks and to regulate financial disclosure were made, it 
was rare that they were ever taken seriously.59 The major focus of both the 
government and business at the time was on turning a profit.60 
Early investment in the stock market was very speculative in nature and 
had many systemic problems because corporations wanted capital without 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id.  
 52. See Prieur du Plessis, Fear Grips Stock Markets as Economies Tip into Recession, 
MARKET ORACLE, Oct. 5, 2008, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article6631.html. 
 53. Thomas Omestad, Does Financial Crisis Threaten America’s Central Role in Global 
Economy?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/ 
2008/10/10/does-financial-crisis-threaten-americas-central-role-in-global-economy.html; Brown 
& Lundblad, supra note 1. 
 54. See Mark Deen & Isabelle Mas, India Joins Russia, China in Questioning U.S. Dollar 
Prominence, BLOOMBERG, July 4, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=aR7yfqUwTb4M#.  
 55. See Omestad, supra note 53. 
 56. See William R. Pape and Robert Sadler, Adding Traceability Review to the External Audit 
(Packing and Food Safety), ENTREPRENEUR.COM, Sept. 2008, http://www.entrepreneur.com/ 
tradejournals/article/print/186284581.html. 
 57. See Harold Bierman, Jr., The 1929 Stock Market Crash, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (2008), 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/Bierman.Crash. 
 58. SEC, supra note 22.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  
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regulation and eager investors were willing to invest their money regardless 
of whether the market was properly regulated.61 Corporations artificially 
inflated stock prices to make them appear more desirable and lenders 
artificially inflated interest rates as well.62 There was also an increase of 
purchasing stocks on margin, which facilitated the “final expansion and 
crash of the stock market.”63 Common sentiment at the time was that 
eagerness and optimism had created an “‘exaggerated balloon of American 
stock values.’”64 Many media outlets, as well as government officials, 
began to see that the stock was excessively inflated, and started to make 
public statements which ignited fears that the stock was in fact 
overvalued.65 These statements led to a panic and investors began to sell 
their stock rapidly,66 eventually causing the 1929 stock market crash and the 
Great Depression that followed.67 
The Great Depression wreaked havoc on the American economy and 
necessitated a national solution to revive the capital markets. With over 25 
billion dollars of worthless stock in their possession in the beginning of the 
1930s,68 it is no surprise that investor distrust of the market was rampant. 
Many Americans, individual investors, banks, and corporations feared for 
the future of the nation’s financial state.69 The idea of federal regulation of 
the booming securities market was never popular, but the national scope of 
this crisis required a national solution.70 Solving the financial crisis fell on 
the shoulders of Congress, the national body best suited to perform the 
research necessary to fashion a solution.71 
In light of the Great Depression, Congress immediately began holding 
hearings with the intention of determining the quickest and most effective 
solution to restore the financial markets.72 “There was a consensus that for 
the economy to recover, the public’s faith in the capital markets needed to 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id.; see also Bierman, supra note 57; Steven Ramirez, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
ENOTES.COM, http://www.enotes.com/major-acts-congress/securities-exchange-act. 
 62. Bierman, supra note 57. 
 63. See Gene Smiley & Richard H. Keehn, Margin Purchases, Brokers’ Loans and the Bull 
Market of the Twenties, 2 BUS. & ECON. HISTORY 17, 129, 139 (1988) (noting that while the role 
of buying on margin as a cause of the Great Depression may often be “overstated,” it is 
undeniable that the ability to purchase stocks on margin facilitated the expansion and depth of the 
consequences of the Great Depression).  
 64. Bierman, supra note 57, at 1–2 (quoting ECONOMIST 806 (Nov. 2, 1929)).  
 65. Id. at 6.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. SEC, supra note 22.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. This was a national depression with national consequences; thus, the goal of Congress 
was to fashion a national response that would create uniform rules of fair dealing across the 
country and protect investors nationally, as opposed to ad hoc measures taken by individual states 
or exchanges. Id.  
 72. Id.  
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be restored.”73 This would prove to be a daunting task, as it was at the 
hands of these very markets that many Americans lost exorbitant portions 
of their personal wealth.74 
Within several years, Congress began to construct a legislative solution 
to restore the economy. The national legislative effort to restore the capital 
markets began with the Securities Act of 1933, followed with the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and culminated with the creation of the SEC.75 The 
goal of the SEC was to “restore investor confidence in our capital markets 
by providing investors and the markets with more reliable information and 
clear rules of honest dealing.”76 This was accomplished through two major 
initiatives. First, all companies that offered securities for public investment 
would be required to make the public aware of their financial state, the 
particular types of securities they are selling, and the risks that will be 
involved with the particular investment.77 Second, all individuals involved 
in the financial markets, including brokers, bankers, dealers, and the 
exchanges themselves, were required to treat investors honestly and make 
the individual investor their paramount concern.78 
The primary way that the SEC attains these goals is through the free 
flow of information transmitted to the public through various reporting 
requirements that publicly traded corporations were required to complete.79 
One way that the SEC ensures the accuracy of information that is disclosed 
by a corporation is through mandatory external audits.80 Once companies 
fulfill the various disclosures necessary to inform the shareholder of their 
financial status, an external accountant must audit the forms.81 The 
accountant is then required to attest to the validity of these statements upon 
reasonable inspection of the company’s financial health.82 This is the origin 
of the role of the auditor in American finance as a means of increasing 
investor confidence in our capital markets.83 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. See The Stock Market Crash of 1929, MONEY ALERT, http://www.themoneyalert.com/ 
stockmarketcrashof1929.html (discussing the effects that the Great Depression had on consumers 
and the fact that many Americans lost their entire life savings as a result of the Stock Market 
Crash).  
 75. SEC, supra note 22.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. See id.  
 79. Id.; see also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006) (the Securities Act of 1933 
created the various reporting requirements that publicly traded corporations are now required to 
comply with). 
 80. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2006).  
 81. Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, SEC, Speech sponsored by Washington University 
School of Law and the Institute for Law and Economic Policy, Scottsdale, Arizona: Audit 
Committees: A Roadmap for Establishing Accountability (Mar. 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch469.htm. 
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 77s. 
 83. See SEC, supra note 22.  
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While it is beyond the scope of this note to discuss in detail, many 
parallels exist between the post-Great Depression era and the financial 
thinking that accompanied it, and the current economic climate that 
America faces today.84 Distrust of capital markets is just as apparent now as 
it was in the 1930s, and the method of getting out of this economic crisis, 
beyond government intervention, is largely based on continued investment 
and spending by individual investors as it was then.85 It is for this reason 
that this note focuses on the need to revisit the same goal of increasing 
investor confidence and the crucial role that the external auditor plays in 
ensuring that corporations are honest with their potential investors that the 
SEC expounded over seventy years ago. Without promoting continued 
investor confidence through the role of the external auditor—and the 
investments that will follow—it is possible that the effects of the current 
financial crisis could be worse than the Great Depression.86 
While the role of the auditor helped to increase investor confidence for 
a period of time, within several decades, fraud and financial misstatements 
became an issue once again.87 The Enron scandal is another crisis that 
revolutionized the role of the external auditor.88 During the 1990s, there 
were multiple instances of accounting fraud, most of which were on a 
massive scale.89 “Some of these instances of frauds were undertaken in 
conjunction with the external auditors of the companies involved.”90 This 
massive corporate accounting fraud involved corporations such as Enron, 
MCI, Inc., Tyco, Qwest, Adelphia Communications, and Global Crossing.91 
Investors quickly lost confidence in the capital markets when such 
orchestrated, large-scale frauds were revealed in many large corporations.92 
While not all of these scandals directly involved auditors as the Enron 
scandal did, many involved auditor oversight, at least tangentially.93 
With the financial disclosure requirements developed by the SEC 
beginning to fail investors once again, and distrust of the capital markets 
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and big business growing exponentially, another national solution became 
necessary to restore investor confidence and promote investment in our 
capital markets.94 Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in 
2002.95 “[SOX] put a necessary spotlight on corporate governance and 
financial reporting.”96 
In addition, SOX “called for the most significant reforms affecting our 
capital markets since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”97 Indeed, SOX 
dealt with the role of auditors as well as the general disclosure required by 
corporations.98 SOX was the culmination of over thirty bills that Congress 
enacted in order to revamp financial reporting, accounting, and retirement 
accounts.99 Due to SOX, “[a]uditors must now face significant changes in 
the regulatory landscape wrought by [SOX] as well as a charged 
environment in which the SEC and others increasingly view independent 
auditors as prime targets.”100 
To these ends, SOX was created with four major goals: “[1] [T]o 
improve corporate governance and ‘the tone at the top’ of a publicly 
[traded] company . . . [2] to strengthen financial reporting and disclosure  
. . . [3] to improve corporate internal controls and auditor performance [and] 
. . . [4] to create a tougher enforcement environment for the [SEC] to 
oversee.”101 
One of these significant changes was the ability of the SEC to censure 
an accountant serving as an external auditor who lacks character and 
integrity, engages in unethical or improper conduct, or who willfully 
violated, or assisted in the violation of, any securities provision.102 SOX 
also altered the statute of limitations for securities fraud claims, making the 
period within two years after the discovery of the fraud but no more than 
five years after the actual fraud took place.103 SOX also made it a felony to 
                                                                                                                 
 94. The Dramatic Change Across the Corporate Landscape to Re-Establish Investor 
Confidence in the Integrity of Corporate Disclosures and Financial Reporting: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 178–79 (2003) [hereinafter 
Hearings on Re-establishing Investor Confidence] (prepared statement of John J. Castellani, 
President, The Business Roundtable) (discussing national legislative efforts to restore investor 
confidence).  
 95. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.). 
 96. Hearings on Re-Establishing Investor Confidence, supra, note 94, at 154. 
 97. Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 
109th Cong. 44 (2005) (testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC). 
 98. Edward P. Leibensperger & Lauren M. Papenhausen, Auditor Liability for Securities 
Fraud After the PSLRA and Sarbanes-Oxley, in SECURITIES LITIGATION PLANNING AND 
STRATEGIES—THE TIME IS NOW! 541, 543 (A. L. I.–A.B.A. Course of Study, May 8–9, 2002). 
 99. Id. at 543.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-
SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2007). 
 102. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3 (2006). 
 103. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2006). 
334 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 4 
destroy financial and auditing records, as well as failing to properly 
maintain such records.104 Auditors are no longer allowed to offer other non-
audit related services to the corporations that they audit.105 Section 204 of 
SOX also requires that the auditor report to the Audit Committee the 
practices they use during their audits, suggestions they have made to 
management of the corporation, and all of their communications with 
management during the auditing period.106 Auditors must now attest to the 
reports that they file as well as their assessment of the state of the 
corporation, making themselves individually liable for the validity of the 
reports.107 The extensive regulation that SOX has focused on auditors 
illustrates the importance that the SEC places on the role of the external 
auditor as a means of furthering the goal of increasing investor confidence. 
Further regulating the important role of the external auditor, SOX 
created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which 
falls under the oversight powers of the SEC.108 The PCAOB is a further 
effort to ensure that fraud does not continue at the level of the external 
auditor.109 It serves several functions, namely to: 
(1) register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for 
issuers . . . ;  
(2) establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality control, 
ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the preparation of 
audit reports for issuers, in accordance with [§] 103;  
(3) conduct inspections of registered public accounting firms, in 
accordance with [§] 104 and the rules of the Board;  
(4) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings concerning, 
and impose appropriate sanctions where justified upon, registered public 
accounting firms and associated persons of such firms . . . ;  
(5) perform such other duties or functions as the Board (or the 
Commission, by rule or order) determines are necessary or appropriate to 
promote high professional standards among, and improve the quality of 
audit services offered by, registered public accounting firms and 
associated persons thereof, or otherwise to carry out this Act, in order to 
protect investors, or to further the public interest;  
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(6) enforce compliance with this Act, the rules of the Board, 
professional standards and the securities laws relating to the preparation 
and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of 
accountants with respect thereto, by registered public accounting firms and 
associated persons thereof . . . .110 
Taken as a whole, SOX clearly places more responsibility on auditors 
who once were able to place the blame on a particular corporation.111 SOX 
has made it painfully clear that government regulators believe that the 
auditor’s role of gatekeeper is of the utmost importance and will no longer 
be taken lightly.112 
The impact of SOX has been “largely positive” and it has had a 
significant impact on the confidence that investors have in the capital 
markets.113 In 2004 alone, stock exchanges’ total market capitalizations 
increase by 50%.114 This statistic shows an increase in investor confidence 
in the market in the post-Enron period, and a willingness of individual 
investors to put their money back into the capital markets.115 The post-SOX 
era has seen an increase in conservative filings by corporations in an effort 
to ensure that financial statements are as accurate as possible.116 There has 
also been a decrease in the number of accounting restatements that are filed, 
which most likely means that original statements that are being produced by 
corporations are more accurate the first time around, one of the primary 
goals of SOX.117 
SOX is also credited with strengthening the integrity of the independent 
audit and the value that external audit reports have.118 There has been vast 
improvement in overall disclosure and financial reporting done by publicly 
traded companies, with an effective system of control and enforcement to 
ensure compliance with SOX and the SEC principles in general.119 Auditors 
have stated that the industry has become more diligent and active, that the 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c) (2006). 
 111. See Colin Linsley, Auditing, Risk Management and a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), ENTREPENEUR.COM, Fall 2003, http://www.entrepreneur.com/ 
tradejournals/article/print/111508706.html.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Sarbanes-Oxley at Four: Protecting Investors and Strengthening Markets: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 110th Cong. 56–61 (2006) (testimony of Christopher Cox, 
Chairman, SEC). 
 114. Alyssa Machold Ellsworth, Managing Dir., Council of Institutional Investors, Federal 
News Service, Remarks at U.S. News & World Reports National Issue Briefing: Corporate 
America and Congress: Has Sarbanes-Oxley Increased Investor Confidence? (Oct. 5, 2005), 
available at www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/MediaMentions/ 
USNews_10.05.05.pdf. 
 115. See id.  
 116. Gerald J. Lobo & Jian Zhou, Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase After the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial Evidence, 20 ACCT. HORIZONS 1, 18 (2006). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Leibensperger & Papenhausen, supra note 98, at 559. 
 119. Id.  
336 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 4 
expertise in the industry has largely improved with the personal liability 
that SOX has required the auditors to take on,120 and that it has become 
easier for them to successfully complete their tasks with the corporate 
governance that is in place, as it is easier for them to get the information 
necessary for their reports.121 There has also been increased cooperation 
with the internal and external auditors that helps to promote the overall goal 
of SOX: to increase the validity of statements regarding the financial state 
of corporations.122 
However, while SOX has been heralded as an effective piece of 
legislation used to encourage auditors to take their role as gatekeepers 
seriously, it has also been highly criticized.123 The first criticism that is 
commonly offered is that excessive costs are necessary to comply with 
SOX reporting requirements.124 There are a variety of external costs that 
have developed, and because of the importance and necessity of external 
auditors in the post-SOX era, auditors have raised their prices 
dramatically.125 Specifically, in 2005, auditors raised prices by up to 
58%.126 There have been many auditor dismissals in the post-SOX era, 
largely because many corporations are not willing to pay these high costs.127 
Some of the Big Four’s128 clients have attempted to replace their original 
auditors with more affordable alternatives.129 Yet, overall, publicly traded 
corporations have an undeniable preference for one of the Big Four, as a 
result of their technical skills, reputation, and capacity.130 
One of the most pertinent criticisms of SOX is the increased legal 
liability that auditors now face as secondary actors in corporate fraud.131 
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Because auditors are legally required to verify that the reports they create 
are accurate and truthful, they can now be held legally liable, both civilly 
and criminally, for failure to honestly comply with this verification 
requirement.132 Litigation has proliferated extensively in the post-SOX era. 
“Soaring litigation, settlement costs, and insurance costs have reinforced the 
need for greater quality in corporate governance, financial reporting, 
external audits, and government enforcement of the securities law.”133 This 
liability has provided major momentum towards auditor liability reform.134 
It is important to remember, however, that when auditors comply with the 
law, comply with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
proscribed by PCAOB, and do not involve themselves with fraud, potential 
liability is minimal, if not nonexistent.135 
III. AUDITOR LIABILITIES IN OUR CURRENT LEGISLATIVE 
CLIMATE 
Establishing the liability of external auditors who report on the financial 
health of a company is one of the tools the SEC has employed to increase 
investor confidence, but it has not come without costs.136 While it is true 
that prior to SOX auditors faced legal liabilities, SOX has increased the 
liabilities that auditors face, as they are now required to attest to the validity 
of the statements provided by corporations.137 This liability is a means of 
ensuring that auditors will be careful and accurate when reviewing financial 
statements.138 
The magnitude of the liabilities that auditors face is best evidenced by 
particular lawsuits. “In the first quarter of [2008], PwC 
[PricewaterhouseCoopers] settled three lawsuits[:] Metropolitan Mortgage 
and SmarTalk Teleservices each for about $30 million, and Crocus venture 
capital, for $6.1 million.”139 This is only a representative sample of the 
liabilities that auditors have faced.140 In December of 1999, Ernst & Young 
settled with the shareholders of Cendant for a total of $335 million.141 Ernst 
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& Young was accused of failure to serve its function as watchdogs when 
three annual reports, seven quarterly reports, and over twenty registration 
statements were fraudulent.142 This purported failure to ensure that the 
financial statements were properly made along with the reports’ fraudulent 
statements of the corporation’s financial health is most likely what led to 
the settlement.143 
Another large settlement occurred in the litigation between the 
shareholders of Rite-Aid Corporation (Rite-Aid) and KPMG. KPMG agreed 
to pay $125 million to the shareholders as part of the Stipulation of 
Settlement.144 KPMG allegedly failed to accurately police Rite-Aid’s 1999 
restatement of earnings which contained fraudulent information.145 While 
District Judge Dalzell stated that this was a “difficult case,” as it was very 
possible that KPMG itself was a victim as well as the shareholders, the fact 
that KPMG settled shows the stringent liabilities that auditors truly face.146 
This is the exact type of fraud and oversight that the SEC, through 
SOX, has been attempting to prevent.147 The immense legal liabilities that 
auditors face exist because it is necessary to hold them liable in order to 
increase investor confidence.148 To cap liability when mistakes like this are 
still occurring is simply giving auditors a license to be less careful. 
While paying these large settlements is a testament to the liabilities that 
accounting firms face, nothing speaks more obviously to the threat these 
liabilities pose than the collapse of Arthur Andersen. Arthur Andersen was 
Enron’s accounting firm, and, at the time, was the fifth largest accounting 
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firm in the world.149 Although their liability in the Enron scandal was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court in 2005, the wake of the Enron scandal left 
the firm unable to survive.150 Clients began to flee for fear that the firm was 
unable to serve its role as gatekeeper, which, when coupled with the firm’s 
legal liabilities, led to the firm’s demise.151 
The implosion of Arthur Andersen in 2002 sparked the beginning of a 
push towards restricting the liability that accounting firms face.152 Many 
auditors argue that there is a definite risk that more firms could implode in 
the near future in light of the liabilities that accounting firms face.153 Thus 
far, auditors have been unable to gain outside insurance for these 
liabilities.154 While they have attempted self-insurance through wholly-
owned insurance companies, it is not clear that these insurance attempts 
will be sufficient to protect auditors.155 
Auditors arguing for a cap on liability share the same concerns. The 
fear is that the liability that auditors currently face could result in the 
collapse of another major auditing firm.156 The auditor lobby argues that 
while the role of private litigation is important in capital markets, there 
should be “concern over rising litigation costs, ‘mega’ suits, and pressure 
on audit firms to settle cases instead of litigating them.”157 Various actors 
have “moved in numerous ways to place enhanced scrutiny on the financial 
reporting and controls practices within publicly traded firms. Amid this 
flurry of activity . . . [a]uditors now face enhanced vulnerability to liability 
risks that––at least according to some––threaten the . . . viability of the 
industry as we know it.”158 However, the increased liability auditors now 
complain of is the precise liability we want them to face. “The tort system is 
designed to create incentives for auditors to take appropriate actions to 
minimize the issuance of misleading financial statements and to compensate 
users for their recoverable losses” should the auditor fail to properly 
perform its duties.159 Removing potential liability will not further the goal 
of increasing investor confidence through valid and thorough information, 
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as the very mechanism designed to ensure accuracy will be largely 
diminished. 
While shareholders bringing federal securities class actions are 
understandably a potential cause of the demise of one of the Big Four 
auditors, there are other liabilities that auditors face in relation to their role 
as gatekeepers. An auditor could potentially implode as a result of losing its 
ability to practice following criminal sanctions.160 Money sanctions and 
penalizations imposed in both civil and criminal litigation could also bring 
about the potential collapse of an accounting firm.161 And finally, auditors 
face the threat of federal securities class action lawsuits—the impetus 
behind the efforts to cap liability.162 
In light of these liabilities, the Big Four accounting firms have decided 
to lobby for a cap on the potential liabilities they could face, and have also 
attempted to use contractual clauses to shield themselves.163 The Big Four 
are asking the firms they audit to limit their right to sue, and to waive their 
right to punitive damages.164 While this will only cap corporations’ ability 
to sue, it does have the potential to save the accounting firms the large sums 
of money they are forced to pay to the corporations.165 Even though auditors 
will still face liability to the shareholders that bring federal securities class 
actions, the agreements attempt to bar derivative suits.166 Various 
complaints have been made by investors who argue that these agreements 
may violate SEC rules, and that the provisions overall are too self-interested 
and against the SEC principal of putting the investor first.167 Auditors have 
also attempted to further alter their liability, without government assistance, 
through contract law, by including arbitration clauses, indemnity and hold-
harmless provisions, and other similar protections in their dealings with 
clients.168 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING AUDITOR LIABILITY 
While calls for limiting auditor liability are not novel, they are starting 
to gain attention in the United States.169 At the same time they are growing 
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increasingly popular in the European Union (E.U.).170 The Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) claims that it is playing the leading role in 
persuading the SEC to create a limitation to the liability that auditors face in 
light of this trend taking hold in other parts of the global economy.171 
The Big Four argue that any efforts in the United Kingdom (U.K.) to 
cap liability must coincide with efforts to limit liability in the U.S. and 
Europe alike, in order to deal with the many corporations that are listed in 
more than one nation.172 In the U.K. auditors may limit liability 
contractually, provided the shareholders approve it,173 but “cannot enter into 
such arrangements . . . with clients who either dual-listed shares, or listed 
debt in the [U.S.] since it would constitute a breach of [U.S.] auditor-
independence rules.”174 Therefore, a failure to limit auditor liability in the 
U.S. would essentially halt any attempts to limit auditor liability in the 
U.K.175 Corporations listed solely in the U.K. are unlikely to accept capping 
the liability of their auditors if the corporations that are bi-listed do not have 
to.176 This would effectively reverse any advances that auditor liability 
reforms in the U.K. have made to limit liability through shareholder 
agreements.177 
Several groups in the United States are faced with the daunting task of 
developing compelling proposals to cap auditor liability in the United 
States, despite the fact that the liability exists as a means of ensuring that 
auditors properly perform their role. Arthur Levitt, the former SEC 
Chairman, is currently leading a committee charged with the task of 
digesting close to twenty different reports on the potential ways to solve the 
supposed auditor liability problem in the United States.178 Although many 
proposals have been offered, the U.S. Treasury is not taking the pro-cap 
stance that the accounting lobby would have hoped for.179 Reforms limiting 
the auditors’ liability in litigation have not even been addressed by the U.S. 
Treasury or the SEC.180 
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Further supporting the push to limit the liability of auditors is the 
Paulson Committee Report, also known as the Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation.181 The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation is 
“an independent and nonpartisan 501(c)(3) research organization dedicated 
to improving the regulation of U.S. capital markets.”182 The Paulson Report 
speaks to the impairment that the corporate world would face if another 
accounting firm collapses in the near future in light of growing auditor 
liability.183 In particular, the report stated that “there are more than three 
dozen cases involving tens of billions of dollars of potential exposure to 
accounting firms, and expressed the concern that even a relatively small 
share of proportional liability in these cases may lead to the financial failure 
of one of the remaining firms.”184 The report suggested potential aspects of 
the field which need to be reformed to protect the Big Four, including: (1) 
creating a legislative safe harbor for particular auditing practices that are 
used throughout the industry; (2) creating a legislative cap on the liability 
that auditors face; (3) appointing monitors to oversee auditing firms who 
have engaged in particular professional failures; (4) and restricting the 
criminal liability that auditors currently face in the post-SOX era.185 
There are several other committees in the U.S. that also promote a cap 
on liability. Keeping in line with the ideas of the Paulson committee, the 
Bloomberg-Schumer Report186 also recommends a cap on auditor liability 
to maintain the auditing industry in the U.S. and prevent the failure of one 
of the Big Four.187 The Commission on the Regulation of the U.S. Capital 
Markets in the 21st Century has reported on the risks which auditors face.188 
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For their part, the SEC argues that we need to establish more realistic 
expectations of the abilities of auditors, encouraging 
domestic and international market participants and policy-makers to 
engage immediately in a serious evaluation and discussion of possible 
means to address this risk of catastrophic loss [of a large public audit 
firm], including this Commission’s recommendation regarding backup 
insurance sponsored by Group of Eight (G-8) governments or international 
financial organizations, and various proposals . . . regarding safe harbors 
or damage limits in specified circumstances.189 
Because of the global nature of our markets,190 it is worth looking 
further at the E.U.’s move towards limiting the liability of auditors. The 
E.U. has come the furthest in developing plans to limit the liability of 
auditors, with several member states adopting legislation to this end.191 The 
E.U.’s proposals for limiting auditors’ liability mirror plans being 
considered in the U.S.192  
The E.U. has taken several steps towards developing a European wide 
proposal to cap the liability that European auditors face.193 An E.U. 
Commission has been researching the potential ways to cap the liability of 
auditors, and published a paper in 2007 that analyzed proposed means of 
capping liability as well as the potential liabilities auditors may be forced to 
deal with in the future.194 The European push to cap auditor liability stems 
from a litigious climate very similar to that in the United States.195 
Europeans have similar concerns that one of the Big Four auditors there 
could collapse and create potentially negative effects on the economy.196 
The E.U. Commission has proposed four general plans to cap liability, 
and recognizes that due to differences in economies and financial markets 
in different nations, there is probably no “one-size-fits-all approach.”197 
However, research and discussion of plans to cap auditor liability in the 
E.U. are more advanced than those in the U.S. and, as such, are worth 
discussing in more detail.198The four proposals are: (1) a fixed monetary 
cap;199 (2) a cap based on the size of the company that was audited “as 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Id. at 16–17. 
 190. SEC, supra note 22. 
 191. Talley, supra note 153, at 1642; Jeremy Woolfe, Auditor Liability Debate Accelerates in 
EU, COMPLIANCE WK. (Jul. 10, 2007).  
 192. Woolfe, supra note 191. 
 193. See Zubli, supra note 130. 
 194. Commission Plans to Cap Auditors’ Liability, EURACTIV.COM, Jan. 19, 2007, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/commission-plans-cap-auditors-liability/article-
161024?_print [hereinafter EURACTIV]. 
 195. See generally id (discussing “ruinous claims” auditors face in Europe).  
 196. Id.  
 197. Id.  
 198. Whitehouse, supra note 18. 
 199. Marianne Ojo, Proposals for a New Audit Liability in Europe 4 (Mar. 23, 2010), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1407212. 
344 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 4 
measured by its market capitalization;”200 (3) a cap which is established by 
calculating a multiple of the fees charged for the audit;201 and (4) the 
principle of proportionate liability which holds each party (auditor and 
corporation) liable only for the portion of the loss that corresponds directly 
to their degree of responsibility and involvement.202 
The fixed monetary cap on auditor liability is probably the most 
troubling plan, and garners the least support among interested parties.203 
The fixed monetary cap establishes a monetary amount that will serve as a 
ceiling to all recoveries involving litigation against any accounting firm in 
connection with their auditing function.204 The goal of the fixed monetary 
cap is harmonization of E.U. policy, as all member states will have the 
same legislative cap in effect.205 The problems surrounding the fixed 
monetary cap largely revolve around the monetary value amount that will 
be selected by the legislatures.206 If the cap is too low, then even the 
maximum recovery may be unable to protect the largest, most highly 
capitalized corporations.207 If the cap is set very high, this will only work to 
protect the Big Four, as the smaller auditors that currently face liabilities as 
well will not be protected or shielded from the liability they face.208 
While the criticisms to the fixed monetary cap are many,209 several 
European nations have enacted a legislative fixed monetary cap on auditor 
liabilities.210 In December 2005, Belgium codified a law that created a fixed 
monetary cap,211 and established a monetary cap of €3 million for the audit 
of an unlisted company that is either required by statute or requested by a 
particular law or regulation, and a cap of €12 million for listed 
corporations.212 Coupled with this fixed monetary cap is a compulsory 
insurance policy, which ensures that coverage is in line with the potential 
liabilities that auditors can face in the new regime, guaranteeing that 
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auditors are sufficiently insured.213 The Directive General for Internal 
Market and Services of Belgium supports having fixed monetary caps 
throughout Europe, but agrees that this cannot be on an across the board 
basis and favors setting the cap at different levels depending on the 
particular member state.214 Austria, Germany, and Greece215 also have 
auditor liability caps that serve as a flat ceiling on potential recovery from a 
lawsuit.216 
While fixed monetary caps have been put into effect in several nations, 
they are still highly unpopular.217 The first major issue is that a flat 
monetary cap will always be a one-sized fits all approach.218 Whether it is 
the E.U. or the U.S., different jurisdictions have a “‘diversity of 
circumstances in terms of both audits and company size . . . such that it is 
unlikely that a one-size-fits-all . . . approach is the most [appropriate].’”219 
Beyond the inadequacy of the implementation of the policy is the 
underlying principle that the SECs purpose of making individuals 
personally liable was to ensure high-quality accurate work to promote 
investor confidence.220 “Limiting auditor liability would reduce auditor and 
audit firm accountability, provide a significant market incentive to take 
audit shortcuts, aggressive treatments, and reduce overall audit quality to 
the detriment of investors.”221 This lack of accountability, and the resulting 
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decrease in investor confidence, is the precise reason why the cap on 
auditor liability is not the proper solution.222 
Providing auditors with a fixed monetary cap as a ceiling to liability 
will most certainly decrease the incentive to provide accurate and thorough 
reports to investors on the financial health of a corporation. This proposal 
goes directly against the SECs goal of increasing transparency and will 
likely decrease investor confidence once they learn that auditors’ liabilities 
are capped.223 Furthermore, the fact that there is a precise dollar amount for 
the cap could lead auditors to do a cost-benefit analysis to determine 
whether it is cost-effective to expend the labor and time necessary to 
perform the most accurate audit reports. In our current economic climate, 
we need continued investment from investors. Establishing a policy that 
will threaten the prospect of increased investment by reducing investor 
confidence is not befitting of our financial crisis. 
The next proposal is a cap based on the size of the corporation being 
audited.224 The goals of this system are similar to that achieved by a fixed 
cap, but this method ensures proper compensation “since it considers the 
possible relevance of the audited company’s size with reference to the 
amount of damages that can be assessed.”225 This system will theoretically 
prevent the catastrophic loss that auditors could potentially face should they 
make a mistake that leads the audited corporation or its shareholders to 
sue.226   
Caps based on the size of the corporation are not without their problems 
either.227 Criticisms largely stem from utilizing market capitalization as the 
proxy for determining liability.228 Different nations calculate market 
capitalization in a variety of ways, and there would be difficulties when 
dealing with listed as opposed to unlisted corporations.229 Furthermore, 
market capitalization is a highly volatile figure that can alter drastically 
from the time the audit is performed to when the potential lawsuit begins.230 
Regardless, a cap based on the size of the corporation is still an overall 
ceiling to the liability that auditors will face, and brings with it the same 
problems of decreased quality and accuracy that any other flat cap does.231 
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Auditors will be less careful if they know that they do not face unlimited 
liabilities. This plan may even be worse than a fixed monetary cap because 
auditors’ potential liability to small corporations that are not highly 
capitalized will be relatively minimal. This means that auditors will have a 
disincentive to do thorough work in smaller corporations, regardless of 
whether or not they are listed, gravely affecting the capital markets as 
potential investors will be aware of these decreased incentives. This will not 
only deter investment in smaller corporations, but will also diminish 
confidence in the stock market in general as the major incentive for auditors 
to do thorough work would be limited. 
The third proposal is a cap that is calculated by taking a multiple of the 
audit fees the auditor charged for the services in question.232 This plan is 
purported to be a neutral basis from which to formulate a cap.233 This plan 
also avoids the potential disparate risks that would exist between listed and 
unlisted companies.234 A cap based on a multiple of the audit fee is a system 
of liability capping that is seen by many to be a reasonable proxy for 
proportionate liability because the audit fee is negotiated by reference to the 
size, complexity, and risk of the audit assessment.235 
There are arguments against utilizing a multiple of the audit fees 
charged because this plan risks creating a fee dropping scenario whereby 
auditors will continuously decrease the cost of their auditing services and 
try to make up for the loss in non-audit services.236 This decrease in costs 
could also mean that the potential will exist for decreased quality, thereby 
rendering audit reports inadequate to promote investor confidence in the 
capital markets.237 Furthermore, when large corporations pay for audit 
services, they normally pay a large amount for the entire corporation that is 
often arbitrarily allocated to different individual group members, and 
therefore, may not be entirely proportional to the work that has been done 
or the liability that should exist.238 
While multiplying the auditor’s fees may arguably be more reasonable 
than a flat cap on liability, it is merely the lesser of two evils. Capping 
liability, regardless of the dollar amount that is used, still reduces the 
incentive to perform quality audits. Furthermore, since auditors are the ones 
calling for this cap, it is extremely likely that the industry as a whole will 
set artificially low prices to cap liability as low as possible. Auditors will 
focus on the non-audit aspects of their business, and the role of the external 
auditor, as the SEC has created it, could largely disappear. Liability will be 
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so minimal that fear of litigation will no longer serve as an impetus to 
honestly report to potential investors. 
The final plan calls for proportionate liability.239 The basic premise of 
proportionate liability is that the auditor is only liable for the portion of 
damage that corresponds to their degree of responsibility.240 Proportionate 
liability has recently gained scholarly attention, as it has been included in a 
plan adopted by the U.K.241 Amendments have been made to the Companies 
Act in order to permit auditor liability limitation agreements.242 The 
Companies Act requires approval of auditor liability limitation agreements 
by the shareholders and the agreement must be fair and reasonable in order 
to be upheld.243 This is the key component to the legislation because it gives 
courts the ability to override any element of the agreement that is neither 
fair nor reasonable, and set a new level of liability, regardless of who has 
approved the contract.244 While the determination of what is fair and 
reasonable is left to the courts, the Companies Act states abstract principles 
to guide courts in rendering their decision.245 In fact, the guiding principles 
are so abstract that they offer little to no actual guidance to the courts 
anyway.246 
Proportionate liability is often favored by a majority of constituencies 
that support capping the liability of auditors.247 Yet, it is still defective. 
There are difficulties surrounding how the court will determine what the 
exact degree of responsibility was for particular individuals or groups.248 
Furthermore, terms such as “fair and reasonable” or “proportionate to their 
responsibility,” which serve as the backbone of the limitation agreements, 
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are not definitive legal standards.249 Even in the U.K., where proportionate 
liability has been adopted, regulators have made it clear that they will not 
define the parameters of the fair and reasonable standard.250 Rather, this 
determination will be made on a case-by-case basis, allowing the courts to 
substitute their own terms where they find that the contractual limit was 
insufficient.251 Establishing proportionate liability through contractual 
clauses may not be feasible for all nations, especially those where auditors 
can be held liable in tort law.252 Furthermore, depending on how high the 
degree of responsibility is, the liability the auditors face may still be 
incredibly high, failing to address the largest grievance of proponents of 
any plan to cap the liability of auditors.253 
Theoretically, proportionate liability appears to be the most promising 
means of capping auditor liability, as auditors will only be held liable for 
their own misconduct. However, determining the liability of each party 
involved in corporate misconduct that could potentially have occurred over 
long periods of time, in various parts of the corporation, will be difficult, if 
not impossible. Allowing courts to determine what is fair and reasonable in 
an agreement to cap the liability of auditors permits judges to act as 
legislators in determining when and how the liability of auditors should be 
capped. This means that different courts throughout the country will 
establish varying standards for what is fair and reasonable. If auditors’ 
liabilities are going to be capped, then it should be a result of a uniform 
decision by the legislature to provide a national solution. 
While there are many proponents for capping auditor liability,254  
[a]rtificially limiting auditor liability [will] diminish incentives to push 
back on overreaching management, reduce auditor accountability and 
reduce audit quality. This would, in turn, harm our capital markets, 
because it would undermine the most precious and fragile commodity we 
have—investor confidence in the accuracy and transparency of financial 
statements. To sum up the merits of a cap on auditor liability in two 
words: Not smart.255  
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Because individual investors are vital to our capital markets, we must 
be sensitive to their needs and consider what policies are best suited to 
protect their interests and confidence in the market.256 
CONCLUSION 
In considering the potential effects of capping the liability of auditors it 
is necessary to keep in mind what the role and the purpose of the external 
auditor is in our international capital markets.257 The significance of the 
audit is due to the fact that it provides 
an important part of the capital market framework[,] as it not only reduces 
the cost of information exchange between mangers and shareholders but 
also provides a signalling mechanism to the markets that the information 
which management is providing is reliable. The auditor provides 
independent verification o[f] the financial statements of a company and as a 
result, the audit loses its value when such independence which gives 
credibility to the financial statements, is undermined.258  
Statutory auditors are an integral aspect of establishing investor 
confidence in our capital markets.259 In light of the current domestic 
financial crisis, and the effects that the U.S. capital markets have on the 
global capital markets as a whole,260 investor confidence is incredibly 
important to promote investment in the U.S. capital markets.261 In a 
recession, investor confidence is arguably one of the most important 
aspects to promote increased investment, thereby increasing demand and 
decreasing layoffs.262 The success of a capitalist system is based on 
growth and investment. Establishing sufficient investor confidence 
ensures this.263 
Auditors argue that they face potentially devastating liabilities. 
However, if their work is properly performed, these liabilities cease to exist. 
Decreasing liability decreases the incentive to do thorough and accurate 
work, as the potential costs of a mistake are lessened when liability is 
decreased. Auditor liability was created by the SEC to increase accuracy 
and investor confidence. Decreasing auditor liability will go great lengths in 
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shattering the confidence of investors. “Investor [confidence] provides the 
foundation on which the American securities market has been built. 
Without such trust, our market would be a thin shadow of its present 
self.”264 It is evident that to cap liability at a time when investor confidence 
is needed most is both inappropriate and irresponsible financial legislation, 
and the U.S. capital markets cannot afford the loss of investment that will 
accompany a cap in this financial crisis.   
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